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I remember Berger and Luckmann’s book—its dustcover with its orange-red 
title on an olive-green background—because it was always there on my 
shelf, in 1970–1971, when I was doing my Master’s degree at the 
University of Essex. Of course, it was still on my shelf for years after that, 
but it is from that time that I have clear visual recall. It was the title written 
on the spine of the book that I remember—The Social Construction of 
Reality—because, to tell the truth, I never got much from reading it. Indeed 
I can’t remember what was in it. The book certainly provided inspiration 
but for me the direct inspiration came from what was written on it not in it. 
There was also, of course, an indirect inspiration: this is what the book did 
for the thinking of the community that set the standards for my work and 
helped me to talk freely of the social construction of scientific knowledge 
without ridicule. 
AQ1 
Now, this lack of direct inspiration is not quite such a negative thing as it 
may appear. First, there are only a few things that I can remember from 
45 years ago; second I am a terrible scholar; and third, and I think most 
important, I read and use material in a very particular way. Most weeks in 
Cardiff the Centre for the Study of Knowledge, Expertise and Science 
(KES) holds a seminar and in yesterday’s (Friday, 20th November, 2015), 
one of the things we talked about was how we use the literature. The first 
thing that became clear was that particular books have particularly strong 
impacts on people according to the state of the world and where particular 
people are in their lives and academic careers. Remember, most of what 
Kuhn said had already been said in the 1930s by Ludwik Fleck in Genesis 
and Development of a Scientific Fact but compared to Kuhn’s book, Fleck’s 
book had negligible influence. Thus, the received model of an academic 
book considers its influence to be a function of its content but it is far from 
being as simple as that. 
 
It is not entirely untrue that what’s in a book affects its influence because 
one can certainly establish that the large majority of academics books, and 
papers, have no potential to be significantly influential leaving only a small 
proportion that might or might not have influence; I could write an 
uninfluential book any time you ask me. The point is, however, that how 
those few that do have influence become separated out from the larger 
number with what remains only potential influence depends on all manner 
of contingencies and timings. Which ones have influence on ‘you’; and 
‘me’ in particular is the upshot of another set of contingencies. Of course, 
most of those that could have an influence won’t have an influence just 
because of the sheer numbers of books and papers out there. For example, I 
have written about 200 papers and 18 books nearly all of whichI believe are 
potentially influential but even if I am right, 200 papers and 18 books are 
just too many for people to read in the kind of depth that is needed if a book 
is to change your life rather than lead to a ritual citation. 
 
That the contents of ‘Berger and Luckmann’ had no direct influence on me 
was contingent on the fact that the big moment in my cognitive life, at least 
in so far as social constructivism was concerned, had happened in 1967 
when I read Peter Winch’s, 1958,The Idea of a Social Science under 
circumstances that caused me to read and re-read it over and over for 
3 months until I believed I understood it (you see, no-one has time to read 
lots of books in that way). That, neo-Wittgensteinian book, gave me the 
idea of ‘form of life’ and the place I went from there was back to 
Wittgenstein’s, 1953,Philosophical Investigations, which, I concluded, I 
could easily understand in the light of my understanding of Winch, even 
though philosophers treat the book as a bit of a mystery and argue about 
what it means to this day. 
 
I was going to wind up studying the sociology of science but I did not know 
that at the time because I would not do any kind of research until 1971. But 
I was already fascinated by the philosophy of science and that caused me, 
probably in 1968, to pick off the shelf of a bookstore a little hardback with 
the intriguing title, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As I read that I 
immediately saw it as an application of Winch/Wittgenstein to science and 
that the central point of what Kuhn was saying has already been anticipated 
by Winch—see Winch’s discussion of the development of the germ-theory 
of disease around page 120. Thus, by the time I got around to doing my first 
piece of research, which was my little dissertation at the end of my Master’s 
thesis (entitled ‘The Sociology of the CO2 Laser’1), I already had quite 
enough theory to be going on with. But, when I got to my PhD, which 
involved among other things, the beginning of my studies of gravitational-
wave physics and led, in 1975, to the publication of what I consider to be 
my key paper: ‘The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology of a 
Phenomenon, or The Replication of Experiments in Physics’, I knew what 
to call the kind of overall approach to science that grew out of it. I could 
call it ‘the social construction of science’ and that was because of what was 
written on Berger and Luckmann’s book and was therefore on every 
sociologist’s lips from the 1960s onwards. That is to say, the book had an 
influence on me via its influence of the form-of-life of sociology as it was 
developing in the 1960s and 70s and for that to happen I did not have to 
know what was in it given that I had already got to a similar place from a 
different starting point. 
 
Let me now return to the peculiarities of me as a social science academic 
with a philosophical bent. When people grow old it is said that they more 
and more ‘grow into their personalities’. That’s a nice way to say it: a less 
nice way is to say that their peculiarities become more and more salient to 
the point of eccentricity. From the point of view of someone inside that set 
of peculiarities, what it feels like is that you are coming to understand the 
world better and better and finally beginning to see it for what it really is, 
and you can say what it is out loud because you no longer have anything to 
lose or anyone to defer to. 
 
The understanding that has crept up on me after a lifetime in this game is 
that for social scientists and philosophers there are two quite distinct ways 
of relating to the literature. This is very hard to grasp because the early part 
of every academic career and most of the rest of that career allows only one 
way of relating to the literature. As an undergraduate your essays had better 
handle and meld together all the relevant sources; your PhD had better 
contain a discussion of every relevant reference; and as a teacher you had 
better know the literature much better than those you are teaching and it is 
likely that you will naturally fall into assessing your students’ work in the 
same way as yours was assessed—‘have they understood and handled the 
sources properly’. I think the large majority of social science and 
philosophy academics stick with that model and one can see that large 
amounts of academic writing in sociology and philosophy are extended 
essays in something like the history of ideas. To put a positive gloss on this, 
stealing from one of the contributors to our recent KES seminar, this kind of 
writing is to take part in a 2000 year-long conversation. That is what I’ll 
call ‘the humanities approach’. 
 
But I discovered early on that among all the things I’m not good at—the 
higher reaches of mathematics, the kind of recall required of a top 
historian—I was no good at this scholarly stuff either. I found out during 
that Master’s degree when, trying to make scholarly sense of my fascination 
with Wittgenstein I spent months comparing Wittgenstein’s thinking with 
that of phenomenologists such as Husserl and wrote a 40-page essay 
arguing that the two led to the same place. I was told that the essay was no 
good, which decided me to cease pursuing that kind of exercise, but I also 
became convinced that I had wasted my time in a second way because if 
they led to the same place why not just use the Winchian/Wittgensteinian 
resource on which I had already expended so much energy in ‘turning my 
cognitive head around’. Why not get on and do the work that could now be 
done with this reversed head rather than spend ages trying to ‘scholar it up’ 
(another phrase borrowed from the KES seminar), with more academic 
resources which would not change anything beyond giving more 
grandiloquence to what came out of the other end. 
 
The point is this: if one takes the humanities approach, corralling the other 
academic resources is not ‘scholaring up’ or simply increasing 
grandiloquence, it is actually doing the work of taking part in the 2000 year 
old conversation and to miss people out of that conversation is to do the job 
badly—so you have to read and re-assemble everything. If, on the other 
hand you take what I am going to call the ‘scientific approach’, which is 
about using such resources as you need to do the work of understanding the 
world better, then reading sources that are only going to deliver you to the 
same substantive starting point and affect only the appearance of things is 
not a good use of time. This is not to say that there is no need for lots of 
different ways of getting to the same starting point and therefore need for a 
variety of people to be taking part in the 2000-year long conversation at the 
same time (like Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists) and there is also 
need for new people to be entering the conversation as time passes, because 
each person and each generation begins the journey from somewhere 
slightly different. But if you are already where you want to be it does not 
make a lot of sense to be studying new generations’ ways of getting there or 
even your own generation’s alternative ways except as a matter of curiosity.  
 
Let us briefly turn aside from the main point and consider how Berger and 
Luckmann’s book bears upon the last paragraph or two. The last paragraph 
or two are reflections on the social construction of our own disciplines—
sociology and philosophy. They are reflections on the different ways it is 
possible to do something which counts as sociology or philosophy: one way 
will involve starting with the literature and working ones way through it; 
one way will start with the world and use the literature only sparingly when 
and where it helps with understanding the world better. One accepts that the 
same help can be obtained from many and varied sources and there is no 
more need to use them all than to get ten people to help a child across the 
road, just because ten people could do it, when one will do. More and more, 
as the shape of my eccentricity sharpens, I am coming to believe that these 
two approaches to our disciplines are really very different and cause a great 
deal of harm by being confused with each other. 
 
Sticking to the theme of the origins of the social construction of our own 
disciplines, we can see that a large part of the trouble has been caused, in 
sociology at least, by the hijacking of the term ‘science’ by that wing of the 
discipline that believes only social surveys and statistical analyses are 
scientific. That claim is readily acknowledged by the non-statistical wing 
which seems anxious to align itself with the more glamorous humanities and 
is more than ready to surrender the accolade of ‘science’, a trend which 
seems to have been accelerated and reinforced by the invention of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. (Remember, this discussion can be 
happening only because of the existence of the world that Berger and 
Luckmann helped to bring into being). This is a shame because the 
sociology of scientific knowledge should change our understanding of the 
meaning of science from a set of techniques (as the social statisticians take 
it to be), to a set of intentions, central to which is the intention to do work 
which others can replicate and confirm. There is absolutely nothing in the 
non-statistical, participatory, so-unfortunately-called ‘subjective’ approach 
that prevents its findings being replicated and confirmed; all that is needed 
is a determination to do it well and with integrity. Notice, however, that the 
humanities-style employment of the same methodology and the same 
subject matter would stress the personal qualities of the investigator and the 
many interpretations possible. In the case of the 2000 year old conversation, 
the idea of multiple interpretations are necessary to keep it going: were it 
not so I would be able to look up a table of sources (like a logarithm table) 
and read-off whether the phenomenologists, and various others, were saying 
the same as Wittgenstein or not and just pick one source from a list of 
sources with the same implications, saving a huge amount of trouble.  
Now there are polymaths and brilliant people who can handle both the 
humanistic approach and the scientific approach at once but they are few. 
Consider philosophy: I think most philosophers are essentially historians or 
analysts of ideas who spend most of their time pulling together the work of 
other philosophers rather than worrying about how the world is. On the 
other hand, though I do not know how good my hero Wittgenstein was at 
pulling together the work of others, I do know that when he decided to 
spend time sitting at the end of a Norwegian fiord in order to resolve certain 
problems that was not what he was doing because if it was he would have 
wanted to be near the library. 
 
I’ve found that the insights I sweated to achieve in 1967 when I came across 
Winch have been good enough to sustain me throughout my academic life 
with only occasional extras. For example, I found Peter Berger’s  Invitation 
to Sociology terrifically useful and read it again and again. But I read it over 
and over because it told me how to practice and describe the kind of 
sociology I already knew I wanted to do. Nearly always these days, when I 
find the new ways of saying the old things my reading is designed just to 
make sure I am not missing anything and is not carried out in the 
expectation that I am going to learn anything fundamentally new beyond 
some helpful ways of saying things. And that, I can now see, applied as 
long ago as 1970 when I kept opening that book with the intriguing title in 
orange-red on an olive ground and finding nothing vital in it. But, to repeat, 
this does not mean one should underestimate the impact of that book and its 
title on creating a academic world in which I could flourish—a world in 
which the notion of the Social Construction of Reality was a possibility. 
Berger and Luckmann to reiterate, helped to create that world.  
 
To reinforce the point one more time, a book I did read pretty carefully was 
Kuhn’sStructure of Scientific Revolutions, but I didn’t learn a great deal 
from that either because it to just led me back to Winch and Wittgenstein—
though Kuhn showed me how to apply the ideas to science and without him 
I might not have noticed the importance of those remarks around page 120 
of Winch’s book. But mostly, Kuhn created the world of analysis of science 
in which I could do my work; Kuhn helped to create ‘The Sixties’ without 
which I do not think there would have been any sociology of scientific 
knowledge. That’s what Berger and Luckmann did: help create ‘The 
Sixties’. 
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Which led to my 1974 paper, ‘The TEA-Set; Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks’, which 
was to be reprinted in a collection 25 years later. 
 
